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Discussion Paper Advancing Industrial Politics from Below: People’s Centred Agenda for Alternative Regionalism In ASEAN

Co-published: Focus on the Global South, Alyansa Tigil Mina, Sahita Institute, Transnational Institute, PWYP Indonesia, Asia-Pacific Gathering for Mineral and Human Rights

November 17, 2026
in Campaign, Trade Justice
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Background

The escalation of geopolitical tensions between the US and China have systematically changed the global neoliberal production model and extensive transnational value chains have become starkly fragile. Meanwhile, industrial policy has re-emerged as a central instrument of economic statecraft, particularly in advanced industrialised countries. This return of industrial policy aims to ‘reshore’ critical production capacities in response to conflicts over territory, resources resilience, and technological leadership in areas such as artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, quantum computing, and clean energy.

ASEAN finds itself in a dilemma as it faces global geopolitical pressures centred in the competition for two vital resources: energy security and the supply of mineral raw materials for strategic industries. The restructuring of international supply chains, triggered by global trade tensions, has strengthened the agenda of regionalism through enhanced supply chain integration of the ASEAN region as a global production hub, particularly for its external key partners like China, Japan, and South Korea. This has also spurred growing interest in strategic investment by multinational companies, where the region accounted for 15 per cent of total global FDI inflows, to strengthen its supply chains in some key industries such as green tech for energy transition agenda and digitalization. The agenda will also increase the green energy demand in the region 2.6-fold by 2050, with the industry and transport sectors expected to account for 84% of total demand.

The tug-of-war over energy security and mineral supply chains has triggered a resurgence of protectionist practices, including tariffs and subsidies, as well as strategic intervention by developed nations that have been pushing for a more asymmetric system of bilateral trade and investment arrangements in the region.

In responding to this situation, there is a growing interest of countries in the Global South, including in ASEAN, to reconsider the state’s role in industrial development as a response to geopolitical contestation, including structural dependence and vulnerability within the global economy. It has also followed the growing trend of resource nationalism. Resource nationalism policies are adopted as a reaction to global inequalities and asymmetrical rules, aimed at enhancing political bargaining power to gain momentum in today’s geopolitical struggles. This has become a political and economic maneuver for countries in the Global South, particularly as they refuse to take sides in order to maximize their national development interests.

However, the narrative of resource nationalism employed by governments in the Global South is often intertwined with the interests of state elites and oligarchs seeking to reap greater profits in the name of state ownership and management of natural resources. In this context, resource nationalism in developing countries of the global south that seeks to drive structural economic transformation reinforces the state’s developmentalist agenda and takes the form of neo-extractivism and green colonialism.

Therefore, to radically respond to these trends, a grassroots political movement is essential to provide political intervention through popular movements in advancing people-centered agenda as we called industrial politics from below.

This topic explored in a “Webinar on Alternative Regionalism,” titled *Advancing Industrial Politics from Below: Key Issues, Challenges, and the Way Forward*, held on October 6, 2026. The webinar was co-organized by Focus on the Global South, the Transnational Institute, Alyansa Tigilmina, Sevana Project Southeast Asia, the Sahita Institute, the MKE Coalition, and the Asia Pacific Gathering for Mining and Human Rights.

The discussion served as a space to define critical stance and joint recommendations for collective intervention of the ASEAN Peoples’ Forum and the 49th ASEAN Leaders Summit, in Manila, the Philippines.

Key Challenges on Industrial Policy Competition in the Region

  1. Resources Extractions for Supply Chain Security

The US-China conflict is now being redefined on who gets to access and to control the transition minerals and strategic digital technology. And two things are battling it out in the ASEAN region now Pax Silica led by the US and EU, and then the WAICO (the world Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization) led by China. Pax Silica is a United States-led strategic international initiative launched by the U.S. Department of State to secure and build resilient global technology supply chains. The alliance focuses heavily on technologies foundational to the artificial intelligence (AI) era—specifically semiconductors, advanced computing infrastructure, and critical minerals. Meanwhile, WAICO is an independent, China-led intergovernmental organization dedicated to global AI governance, technological development, and international cooperation. WAICO offers an AI governance system that it claims is more inclusive and open-source for developing countries (the Global South) promoting technology and knowledge transfer, capacity building, and digital sovereignty.

This battle (Pax Silica VS Waico) has also created an intersection between trade, industrial policy and critical minerals. The result is a progressive erosion of bargaining power and policy sovereignty through several asymmetric bilateral and regional trade deals such as US unilateral agreements, the EU CEPA, Canada FTA, and ASEAN-RCEP. These deals pressured the ASEAN Countries to harmonise digital, energy, and raw materials in trade regulations that facilitate the corporate and global capital thus directly impact the lives of the people.

For example, the energy and raw materials chapter in the EU CEPA touches on the rhetoric language of sustainability and energy transition. In the objectives it says facilitating trade and investments in energy and raw materials, achieving net zero targets through the use of green technologies, improving environmental sustainability. But the real agenda is underpinned by what prohibitive provisions that would curtail the policy space of countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand on such important areas as export pricing, export policies, local content policy, particularly the export ban on nickel in Indonesia. In the end, leaving countries like Indonesia and the Philippines back into the raw material export trap and locked it in the bottom of the global value chain.

On the other side, ASEAN has a fragmented response to this current reality. Only the Philippines and Singapore signed up to Pax Silica, while Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar and Brunei went for WAICO. China and the US have made it clear in public statements that countries cannot join both Pax Silica and WAICO, and countries have to choose which is going to be problematic for many of them. Especially after Trump pushed for broader involvement of ASEAN nations in the “Pax Silica” bloc during the 49th ASEAN Summit in Manila (November 16–19).

Take Indonesia, for example: although it has taken an active role as an official Founding Member of WAICO, the government still seeks to balance its economic and political relations with the United States. This stance of refusing to side with either party is claimed to be part of the pragmatic “Bebas Aktif” foreign policy doctrine. Currently, Indonesia is not a member of Pax Silica, but its relations with the U.S. are conducted by leveraging the agreements reached in the Indonesia-U.S. ART negotiations. Although the US ART has now lost its legitimacy and faces widespread opposition from the Indonesian public against its ratification, the Indonesian government continues to advance its interests through various business agreements, including the signing of 11 MoUs with corporate actors. These MoU deals have, of course, compelled the Indonesian government to align its investment and trade policies with U.S. national security and economic regulations (See Box 1)

Furthermore, the ASEAN Minerals Cooperation Framework is driven by mining corporations and wants to place ASEAN as a major player in the critical minerals value chain. This cooperation also led to the upgrading of regional cooperation frameworks such as the RCEP and bilateral FTAs with key dialogue partners in supply chain activities. New provisions and chapters specifically addressing supply chain resilience, with an emphasis on the smooth flow of goods and services, including critical and essential goods and services during crises.

Box 1: Indonesia’s aligning with US National Security and Economic Regulation

For the Indonesian government, the security alignment provisions in the ART appear to be a condition that must be willingly accepted to secure the ‘promise’ of a US$39 billion business deal. There are 11 MoU signed between Indonesia and the US businesses[1]. One of the key cooperation is the critical minerals including the processing industry for green technology and semiconductor ecosystem.

The Indonesia-US ART Agreement contains provisions that explicitly require Indonesia to align its national policies with US national security and economic regulation[2]. The agreement includes “mirroring” and “discipline” clauses that constrain Indonesia’s relations with non-Parties (specifically China).

In the context of discipline, the ART stipulates provisions that require its trading partners to adopt US export control rules into their domestic regulations, particularly those related to the trade of technology and sensitive goods to national security. These provisions are clearly aimed at limiting China’s trade and investment with Indonesia, particularly in relation to strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, including specifically target cooperative relations between Indonesia and China in the critical minerals sector, including nickel, of which Indonesia has the world’s largest reserves by far. This includes restricting transactions by US trading partners’ citizens with entities listed on the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List and on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) of the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control[3].

Certainly, the ASEAN government’s priority is to respond to the global supply chain which is creating this imbalance in providing the mineral supply and protecting the rights of the people and the environment. The Pax Silica signed by the Philippines gives clear evidence that industrial politics and geopolitics shaping unjust transition mining in the Philippines as explained below (Jaybee Garganerra, Webinar).

The Government of the Philippines has been reactive. Signed up to the Critical Minerals Agreement with the US last February 2026 and within a few months the President issued Executive Order 122 for the Philippines Critical Minerals Framework. This new mining framework produces a lot of issues and impacts the affected communities which give quicker permits, additional contracts and more aggressive entry or expansion of nickel mines in no-go zones. Then, more mineral processing plants will be established in areas where mining clusters are already operating. This also introduces a new set of challenges and environment.

Another aspect is the ugly face of politics and its mining business structure. Beneficial owners of mining are political dynasties, and one of it relates with indications on the Chinese connections to the political dynasties and their mining interest in the Philippines. This issue leads to the problem of shrinking space for democracy and civic engagement where there is a tendency for more authoritarian governments now in power, including lack of transparency and accountability around extractive industries. This is not the interest or objective development objectives of Filipinos in general.

  1. The expansion of corporate power

The second challenge is sustainability and human rights across the supply chains. The emphasis now of trade is really looking at supply chains as a buzzword. And there are two interrelated Issues: First, the rising power of corporations. And, second, the growing number of human rights violations across the supply chain perpetuated by transnational corporations.

The ASEAN regional integration for supply chains has hijacked the agenda of green energy transition where at the same time that the government and the corporation are still demanding enormous amounts of land, mineral, water and energy for the development and the green transition. Millions of people in the Mekong region still depend directly on the very same land and river and forest for their everyday life.

 

Box 2: Case of Rare Earth Extraction in Kachin State, Myanmar[4]

The Myanmar Women Environmental Human Rights Defenders (MWEHRD) Networking Group carried out research that revealed the impacts of rare earth mining in Pangwa, Kachin State, Myanmar. Between 300-370 rare earth mining sites operate across the mountainous region to feed the clean-energy supply chain via cross-border trade with China. Their analysis shows that rare earth extraction and its social, economic, and health impacts on local communities cannot be understood solely through economic lens but also a broader context of armed conflict, militarized governance, fragile institutions, and global supply chain.

Despite the rising integration of the ASEAN supply chain, rare earth mining operations in Kachin State are closely connected to Chinese companies and cross-border mineral trade networks, with minerals transported directly to China. These minerals are extracted under shifting militarized governance, previously by New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) and recently by the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA). Authority over land transfers, extraction permits, and revenues remains concentrated among male-dominated armed authorities and foreign operators. leaving communities excluded from decision-making and turning customary landholders into “guests” in their own land. The Myanmar case shows a unique unequal power relations entangled among the nexus of armed groups-private corporation against local community.

Women in Pangwa have an escalating burden to sustain household livelihoods while navigating severe environmental degradation. Rare earth mining has caused widespread deforestation, soil erosion, and chemical contamination of local streams–drastically reducing rice and orchard yields and forcing women to walk farther to collect and boil clean water. Labor opportunities are also gendered and precarious, confining women to low-paid services roles such as cooking, cleaning, and vending while men and foreign supervisors control higher-paying extraction work.

Faced with checkpoints, surveillance, and intimidation that deter open protest, Kachin women exercise survival-oriented agency through household water filtration, small-scale informal trade, and mutual emotional support via local church networks.

 

But when the country in the region just opened up three decades ago for regional and global investment, the open market economy, the Mekong and Salween Basin also became the major frontier for the large-scale development and the resource extraction. There are numbers of the mainstream dams and also enormous numbers of the hydropower dams inside the country like Laos already built by China in upstream and downstream. And, it has been closely connected to this so-called transformation change in livelihood and natural resources of the people and the country in the region. We also saw the regional economic corridors have transformed the river from the source of this fish, like the sand catfish, to the source of electricity on a large scale (Premrudee, Webinar).

However, the people’s struggle to defend their rights and their territory must contend with corporate power, which is once again legitimized by laws enacted by the government. One of the instruments that has been used to give power to corporations is through investment protection rules called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism under the FTA and Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIT), including critical minerals agreement. The mechanism gives the rights and power to corporations to sue governments and challenge policies in international arbitration. Moreover, these lawsuits of corporations run into millions, sometimes billions of dollars really represent a strain on public resources.

The ASEAN Investment Report 2024 highlights the ASEAN Member States possess a ‘traditional’ network of old-generation investment treaties covering 85 per cent of their FDI stock, which may expose them to a higher risk of ISDS cases. ASEAN also has four agreements specifically governing investment protection with ISDS Mechanism, such as the ASEAN-Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), the ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, ASEAN-Japan Agreement, and the ASEAN-India Agreement.

And then finally we have seen that the voluntary UNGP has clearly not been effective in curtailing human rights abuses where TNCs are not held liable for these violations committed across their supply chain. On one side we are dealing with a binding trade and investment agreement which gives rights and power to corporations, but on the other side the human rights framework often fails to bind and hold corporate accountability for its human rights violations in their business and supply chain activities. Therefore, UN Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9 adopted in 2014, called for a legally binding instrument (LBI) to hold transnational corporations accountable. The LBI as it is called, goes beyond what is existing now the voluntary guidelines of business and human rights. The LBI would address the gap that exists in international human rights law. It is pushing for joint and several liability. The LBI is pushing for stronger recognition of the rights of affected communities. And the LBI more importantly reaffirms and effectively implements the primacy of international human rights law over economic activities, including trade and investment agreements and legislation. Joseph Purugganan from Focus on the Global South explained that LBI will be a tool to balance the power between corporations and developing countries. LBI is also pushed by developing countries as there are big numbers of ISDS cases against them.[5]

Industrial politics from below

The emergence of industrial policies and the resulting economic competition—as a response to global geopolitical tensions—has intensified the practices of neo-extractivism and green colonialism in this region. In fact, the narrative of national sovereignty or nationalist agendas—often framed as development in the name of economic sovereignty— are frequently intertwined with the interests of state elites and oligarchs seeking to reap greater profits under the guise of state ownership and management of natural resources. This has, in turn, reinforced authoritarian capitalism, in which the state no longer acts as a mediator of social and economic interests but rather as a facilitator of corporate capital by repressing resistance and externalizing social and ecological costs.

Therefore, the concept of industrial politics from below has emerged as a counter-hegemonic paradigm. This framework is rooted in grassroots movements and collective intellectual reflection responding to the development of the state’s industrial policy agenda. Industrial Politics from Below is not a new concept, but rather the result of a reaffirmation of the collective political agenda of people’s movements by returning control over ownership and production to the people, as well as integrating social and ecological justice within a decolonial perspective. This was formulated during a meeting of activists from the Global South in Batang, Central Java, Indonesia, (The Batang Meeting) which involved the Beyond Development Working Group as well as labor movements in Indonesia[6], as well as in the Philippines[7].

Conceptually, the Batang meeting called for a strategic shift: replacing neoliberal industrial policies with democratic ones; shifting the focus from profit accumulation toward a people-centered economy; prioritizing production for the fulfillment of basic needs and care work rather than excessive extraction or militarism; strengthening cooperation among countries of the Global South grounded in solidarity rather than unequal exchange; and dismantling life-destroying industries such as the military-industrial complex and luxury sectors serving the ultra-wealthy.

The context is quite clear: “Industrial Politics from Below” aims to drive the restructuring of the material basis of life by building the people’s collective capacity to produce and reproduce life in a just and sustainable manner. In material terms, “industry from below” refers to the ways in which the people build autonomous production capacities—for example, by acquiring and operating rice mills, reclaiming land, managing decentralized energy systems, and reorganizing labor cooperatively.

“Industrial politics from below” also constitutes an effort to transform state policy from the bottom up by aligning the state’s capacity with forms of production that are socially rooted and democratically owned, controlled, and overseen by the people. This is not, however, about centralizing all change within the state.

This entire agenda converges on a transformative vision: transcending the imagination of modern industry and rebuilding the relationship between cities and villages on the basis of mutual support, social and ecological justice, and a historical consciousness that heals the wounds of colonialism and extractive violence. Thus, the politics of industrialization from below is not merely an economic concept, but a political project to restore life. (Benny Agung, Webinar)

Point for Further Discussion: Alternative Regionalism?

The geopolitical contest, especially on critical minerals and AI competitions, continue to reproduce colonial relations within the production process. It has progressively undermined ASEAN-centred regionalism. Therefore, the region’s ability to navigate geopolitical shocks will depend on member states acting collectively, particularly in restructuring the new development pathways directed towards a structural green economic transformation grounded in sovereignty, self-reliance, community-centred justice, and the strengthening of alternative regionalism.

However, in discussing the agenda of alternative regionalism as part of advancing industrial politics from below, there are several key questions that need to be addressed among progressive movements in the region:

Centering People’s Agenda:

  1. When we are talking about the industrial politics from below, it is actually asking the question about production, especially when the investment and the resource extraction became more of a crisis or more urgent. The people in the front line have a very clear idea about how they use their resources or the natural resources depending on their everyday life. But, when the company from outside comes into their territory and starts to produce or extract, the people will start asking: this extract or the production is for whom and whose land, forest and the resources are being used. And most important, who are the people who decide about all this so-called development.
  2. The people’s political power is still fragmented either by the national border or by their separate issues. However, when we are talking about the alternative regionalism from below, we might have to start to think about how we can build the real relationship among people who are asking similar questions. The people in the grassroots can face different struggles, but we are dealing with the same question to really rethink a question of alternative How can they think politically together about the kind of economy, what kind of future they want? How can we develop collective capacity in real life? not only resist, but also how to decide together? Starting from what exactly we have produced and what we want to reproduce. What exactly do we all protect? And what is the meaning of sustainability or how can we do our economic sustainability?
  3. We need to start talking about an industrial policy that responds to the needs of communities. We have to start talking about post-extractivism. We need to document more of the alternatives. We need a platform where the stories of success, of resistance and alternatives are happening. That hope can only start if we start talking with each other. If we start talking with the communities and make sure that we share some shared value, that we want a different kind of development and create connections to create solidarity.
  4. The ASEAN platform should be used as an effective platform for us to see each other and to continue Strengthening each other and discuss the alternative regionalism we can imagine. ASEAN civil society needs more solidarity and we need more coordination in the responses of communities.

Alternative Platforms for Regional Cooperation:

  1. Amidst this very challenging global context, developing countries need to develop more south-south partnerships and cooperation to be able to leverage our resources and advance our own development agenda and not simply align ourselves with the either you choose one hegemonic power over the other, be it China or the US. It requires the development of alternative political blocs to formulate new rules of the game moving beyond “one-size-fits-all” global templates toward regionally grounded strategies that prioritize structural transformation, technological learning, and inclusive development, while guarding against new forms of dependency amid intensifying geopolitical rivalry.
  2. Industrial politics from below should also target the big banks in the global financial regime. Developing countries in the Global South must have monetary and fiscal sovereignty in managing their own macroeconomic policies and not rely solely on financial markets. This would counter the fact that, in today’s global financial architecture, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are the only lenders of last resort. It is prudent to have alternative sources of financing to provide a safety net, especially in this era of repeated exogenous shocks.
  3. Despite the BRICS offering an alternative developmental model, including finance, for the global south, ongoing criticism of this organisation is essential to advance efforts to achieve real sovereignty for Global South countries, both structurally and materially.

******

For further discussion, please contact:

Premrudee, Sevana Project Southeast Asia: premrudee@sevanasea.org
Rachmi Hertanti, Transnational Institute: r.hertanti@tni.org
Jaybee Garganerra, Alyansa Tigilmina: j.garganera@protonmail.com
Olisias Gultom, Sahita Institute: olisias@gmail.com
Joseph Purugganan, Focus on the Global South: josephp@focusweb.org
Aryanto Nugroho, PWYP Indonesia: aryanto@pwypindonesia.org


[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-us-firms-sign-deals-worth-384-bln-textile-energy-tech-sectors-2026-02-19/
[2] Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia on Reciprocal Trade: Section 5 on Economic and National Security.
[3] Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia on Reciprocal Trade: Article 5.2 on Export Controls, Sanctions, Investment Security, and Related Matters.
[4] Myanmar Women Environmental Human Rights Defenders Networking Group, Entangled Frontiers: Women’s Lived Experiences at the Nexus of Conflict and Rare Earth Extraction in Kachin State, Myanmar, 2026 https://drive.google.com/file/d/1X6PwVsqH8lgCpe5mSVZh_ag8_nuM0Iat/view?usp=sharing
[5] Joseph Purugganan during ISDS Public Discussion in Manila, 30 October 2026.
[6] FPBI, KASBI, Kesatuan Perjuangan Rakyat, KSN, PWYP Indonesia
[7] Focus on the Global South-Philippines, Alyansa Tigil Mina, Alt-Dev UP, and Trade Justice Pilipinas.
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